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Abstract
During the 2016 World Economic Forum, the strategy of 
pacification in Rio’s favelas was recognized as the most 
innovative public security policy in the last decade. 
From this scenario, and using Competition State-Ma-
king, this paper analyzes, under a qualitative approach, 
the design and implementation of that initiative. Then, 
we seek to assess its results after implementation, and 
finally outline main lessons to extract from the Brazilian 
case. The main conclusion of this survey is that the Bra-
zilian pacification strategy was based on three pillars: 
operational decriminalization; adoption of comprehen-
sive approach; and coordination between three gover-
nment levels (federal, state, and municipal). 
Keywords: Brazil, competition state-making, organi-
zed crime, pacification. 
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MÁS ALLÁ DE LA PACIFICACIÓN. COMPETITION STATE-MAKING 
EN FAVELAS DE RÍO 
Resumen
Durante el Foro Económico Mundial 2016, la estrategia de pacificación aplica-
da en las favelas de Río fue reconocida como una de las políticas de seguridad 
pública más innovadoras en la última década. A partir de este escenario, y 
utilizando el concepto Competition in State-Making (Construcción Competitiva 
de Estado), el presente artículo analiza, bajo un enfoque cualitativo, el diseño 
e implementación de la iniciativa. Luego, buscamos realizar un balance de los 
resultados obtenidos tras su ejecución, y finalmente, examina las principales lec-
ciones que pueden extraerse del caso brasileño. La principal conclusión de esta 
investigación es que la estrategia brasileña de pacificación se fundamentó en tres 
pilares: descriminalización operacional; adopción de enfoque integral; y coor-
dinación entre los tres niveles gubernamentales (federal, estadual y municipal). 
Palabras clave: Brasil, competition state-making, crimen organizado, pacifi- 
cación. 
ALÉM DA PACIFICAÇÃO. COMPETITION STATE-MAKING NA FAVELAS 
DO RIO 
Resumo
Durante Fórum Econômico Mundial 2016, a estratégia de pacificação nas favelas 
do Rio de Janeiro foi reconhecida como uma das mais inovadoras políticas de 
segurança pública na última década. A partir desse cenário e usando o concei-
to, Competition in State-Making (Construção Competitiva do Estado), este artigo 
analisa, sob uma abordagem qualitativa, o desígnio e implementação da iniciati-
va. Em seguida, faz um balanço dos resultados obtidos após sua execução e final-
mente, examina as principais lições que podem ser extraídas do caso brasileiro. 
O trabalho conclui que sua aplicação foi baseada em três pilares: descriminali-
zação operacional; adoção de foco integrante; e coordenação entre os três níveis 
de governo (federal, estadual e municipal).
Palabras-chave: Brasil, competition state-making, crime organizado, pacifi-
cação.
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Introduction
According to a report prepared by 
the Centre for Democratic Control of 
Armed Forces, Qualified Armed Non-
State Actors: Current Trends & Future 
Challenges, organized crime is largely 
an economic phenomenon in the sen-
se that criminal organizations provide 
goods and services that were origina-
lly provided by the State. This process 
gives to the abovementioned orga-
nizations, in some cases, more social 
legitimacy than the State has in those 
territories (DCAF, 2012, p. 17).
However, it should be noted that, 
unlike the insurgents or terrorists, cri-
minal groups are motivated primarily 
by economic incentives, not for poli-
tical or social objectives. In that sense, 
Ioan Grillo (2016) uses the neologism 
gangster warlords, which is considered 
as more appropriate to define a set of 
hybrid criminal leaders characterized 
by concurrent presence, controlling 
certain territories, and threatening the 
fundamental nature of the state, not 
trying to dominate it completely but to 
seize some of its parts and weaken it, 
operating in it instead. In certain areas, 
they meddle into the State monopoly 
of violence or, more precisely, in the 
state monopoly of war and justice. So, 
to protect the borders of their doma-
ins and kill armed enemies that enter 
their territory, they charge vaccines, 
exercise judgments, provide political 
support, and carry out social work. 
The main deficit of many Latin Ameri-
can countries is the inability to restore 
their presence in its respective territo-
ries, not only from the security pers-
pective but also in a comprehensive 
range of goods and services (see Table 
1). That way, integral presence of the 
State has two levels: firstly, there are 
social actions that will serve to restore 
the confidence between the coercive 
power of the State and the citizens, 
and, in a second level, there are ac-
tions concerning specific responsibili-
ties of the State in mentioned places. 
The first have operational immediate 
value to occupy the zone, motivated 
by the forces on their role as peace-
maker and modifying the attitude of 
their inhabitants towards the police. 
The second was proposed to transform 
the factors that reproduce violence 
and crime (Buxton, 2015). 
Table 1. Configuration of State presence in Latin America
Dimension Limitation on regulatory capacity Limitation on force monopoly
Territorial
All territory vs.
zones of the national territory
All territory vs.
zones of the national territory
Sectorial
All policy areas vs. 
specific policy areas
All policy areas vs. 
specific policy areas
Social
Total population vs.
population segments
Total population vs.
population segments
Temporary Sporadic vs. permanent Sporadic vs. permanent 
Source: Elaborated by author from Maihold, 2015.
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Thus, the more absent the State is from 
its territory or the poorer the services 
provided by it, the more susceptible 
will be the communities to depend 
on criminal organizations that promo-
te illegal economies to become their 
supporters. In contrast, “if these ser-
vices are provided to the population 
and their well-being is improved, this 
will discourage citizens to collaborate 
in illegal activities for income and as 
a result support for criminal organi-
zations will be reduced, further hin-
dering penetration” (Felbab-Brown, 
2010, p. 12). It shouldn’t be forgotten 
that the development of criminal eco-
nomies is directly linked to the lack 
of alternative livelihoods in neglected 
areas. Generally, authorities perceive 
these zones as sanctuaries for crimi-
nals and show no interest in impro-
ving the socio-economic situation for 
their inhabitants.
Following the above, Alda Mejias 
(2014) argues that in strong states 
which respond effectively to the needs 
of their societies criminal groups can’t 
replace the authority. But in areas of 
social and political marginalization and 
poverty in many Latin American cou-
ntries, non-state actors often displace 
the state, gaining the loyalty of large 
segments of society. For this reason, 
Vanda Felbab-Brown (2011) suggests 
that governments stop thinking about 
crime only as an aberrant social activi-
ty that must be eliminated, but rather 
require conceptualizing institutional 
response to violence as Competition 
in State-Making between public bodies 
and Non-state Armed Actors (ANSA’s) 
whose ultimate goal is to win the loyal-
ty of the population. 
That way, a political response adapted 
to this phenomenon can’t be based 
only and exclusively in the vigilance 
and the application of the law in the 
classic sense or the enforcement of 
police – military operatives. Though 
the repressive element is a crucial 
component of the strategy, often it’s 
possible that it could be complemen-
ted with other socioeconomic poli-
cies, so that the dependence of the 
populations breaks in relation to the 
criminal enclaves created by ANSA’s 
(Felbab-Brown, 2016). 
Under this logic, when it comes to 
urban areas permeated by illicit eco-
nomic and violent crime and where 
state presence is weak, governments 
need to follow two interrelated ob-
jectives: First, they must establish 
better their own physical presence. 
In some cases, for example in Rio’s 
favelas (slums), that statement (or 
even insertion) of state authority may 
require the physical retake of terri-
tory controlled by violent non-state 
entities. In others, to establish such 
presence involves demonstrating that 
the prevalence of physical power, if 
not actual monopoly of violence, lies 
in the state apparatus and its enforce-
ment. Second, the government needs 
to regain the population‘s loyalty in 
those areas and away from criminal 
organizations, so its presence should 
not only be strong, but multifaceted 
and positive (Patterson & Blain, 2014, 
pp. 61-62).
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Therefore, an appropriate policy option 
to deal with the aforementioned pheno-
menon must provide means of access to 
public goods and services so that people 
transfer their loyalty to the state, stren-
gthening the ties between the latter and 
citizens, and hence the links among the 
population and ANSA’s weaken.
In other words, the strategic parti-
cipation of these ANSA’s affects the 
fundamental purpose of the State and 
has political implications because they 
act as competitive state-makings, un-
dermining its functionality and legiti-
macy. Thus, the more order, security, 
and t providing of economic goods to 
win the hearts and minds of local po-
pulation, the greater the possibility of 
becoming de facto proto-state rulers 
with a high degree of political capital 
(Felbab-Brown, 2011, p. 6). 
However, socio-economic programs to 
reduce violence aren’t a substitute for 
security. For this reason, prior to the re-
construction of state, a militarized ap-
proach to security should be applied 
to rescue that territory, breaking the 
intimidating power of criminal organi-
zations, restoring the state’s authority, 
and arranging it to the proper imple-
mentation of government programs 
because, “it can’t enter an area domi-
nated by [gangs] with assistance plans 
of the Madre Teresa type, nor is it likely 
to encourage citizen participation in 
places where drug trafficking has terro-
rized society” (Villalobos, 2015).
In short, the success of Competition 
in State-Making depends on the mee-
ting of two interrelated objectives: to 
achieve a better establishment of insti-
tutional presence and to regain the lo-
yalty of population in areas controlled 
by ANSA’s, highlighting its potential 
deterrent against criminal organiza-
tions and demonstrating to society that 
State is stronger than them. In that 
vein, it’s useful to comment what re-
cently happened in Rio’s favelas where 
a fierce war between drug trafficking 
organizations and the state, which has 
lasted for a quarter century, is in the 
process of profound transformation. 
This is due to the implementation of a 
pacification policy by the Carioca’s go-
vernment rescuing the Felbab-Brown 
thesis, designing this strategy as Com-
petition in State-Making between go-
vernment and facções criminosas for 
the population’s loyalty. 
Research design
This survey is based on a qualitative 
analysis which is grounded in a non-
experimental design. In this particular 
case, we use a longitudinal approach, 
combining the use of three key instru-
ments: discourse analysis, to compre-
hend the substantial logic behind the 
pacification strategy; trends descrip-
tion, to understand the main results of 
its implementation and; ex-ante – ex-
post contrast, to assess the impact of 
the UPP in the implementation of the 
above-mentioned strategy. In second 
place, this investigation is based on a 
synchronic-diachronic study and, at 
the same time, is an exceptional case 
(Gerring, 2007). In this sense, the fight 
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against criminal organizations in Rio 
was executed by means of the im-
plementation of a security policy that 
emphasized the military-police coo-
peration as a substantial component 
of pacification including, at the same 
time, a relevant and consistent socioe-
conomic support to the civilians living 
in critical zones.
War in Favelas
Closely related to the issues raised 
in the previous section, it should be 
noted that the absence of State in fa-
velas generated power vacuums that 
criminals covered opportunistically 
in order to control and develop their 
operations when drug trafficking on 
a large scale took off in the South 
American country, endangering the 
residents of these communities and, 
incidentally, questioning two state 
functions under a Weberian basic ma-
trix: territory control and maintain the 
monopoly of violence within its bor-
ders. Following this logic, Rio’s Secre-
tary of Public Security, José Mariano 
Beltrame argue: “favelas were islands 
where the state simply decided to 
leave. Its residents were forgotten and 
ignored, were cooked in a toxic juice 
of extreme poverty, domestic violence 
and, since the late 80’s, the omnipo-
tence of drug traffickers, who specia-
lized in abusing entire communities” 
(Glenny, 2012).
From this perspective, Robert Muggah 
(2016) views Rio as a fragile city be-
cause municipal authorities and their 
institutions are unable or unwilling to 
provide basic services for its residents. 
That is, the cities become brittle when 
the legitimacy, authority, and capacity 
of its institutions properly violate the 
basic functions such as guaranteeing 
the safety of citizens, property, infras-
tructure, access to water, electrici-
ty, and the preserving of basic rules, 
causing a break in the social contract. 
However, it’s clear that fragile cities not 
necessarily lack of State presence, nor 
are ungoverned areas where therefore 
citizens rely on their own resources 
or other actors to meet their needs, 
creating a hybrid government system, 
order, and security. So, Rio was trans-
formed into a Cidade Partida (split city) 
between asfalto (formal city) and fave-
las (informal city). 
The political transition in the country 
that allowed it to return to democracy 
in 1985 coincided with an explosive 
increase in crime rates. This can be at-
tributed largely to the proximity of Bra-
zil with cocaine-producing countries 
such as Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru 
(drug trafficking at that time experien-
ced a boom) creating favorable condi-
tions for distribution and transfer. Thus, 
facções criminosas began to capitalize 
this opportunity and took control of 
many communities1 that were discon-
nected, without access to city services 
1 According to research conducted by Institute of Social and Political Studies (IESP) and State University of Rio 
de Janeiro (UERJ), 370 favelas (37% of total) remain under the control of drug traffickers. See: Goulart, 2013.
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and basic infrastructure such as elec-
tricity, sewage, and garbage collection. 
Added to this, these have been tradi-
tionally considered illegal settlements, 
so they remain socially and politically 
remote from the decision-making are; 
such conditions of favelas transformed 
them into ideal centers of operation 
for facções criminosas. 
In order to consolidate their power 
in these areas, criminal organizations 
replaced the state providing security, 
economic support, and basic services 
to their people. Assuming the role of 
Donos do Morro (owners of the hill), 
they established not only a territorial 
control, but also a social one, maintai-
ning this parallel authority or criminal 
governance based on extrajudicial vio-
lence used by each criminal organi-
zation to punish those who break the 
rules or resolve conflicts within their 
domains (Grillo, 2014; Sampó & Tron-
coso, 2015). In other words, subjecting 
residents of communities to control 
and forcing them to avoid crossing 
linhas vermelhas (red lines), drawn to 
prevent interference from other crimi-
nal gangs in its territory. In fact, once 
it establishes territorial claims and in 
need of protection, one can only ac-
cess the settlements by force or by ob-
taining the permission of the respective 
criminal organization.
In October 2009, a helicopter with 
four soldiers flying over Morro dos 
Macacos community was shot down 
by drug traffickers after police laun-
ched an operation in the area to con-
trol heavy fighting between criminal 
gangs Comando Vermelho and Amigos 
dos Amigos (Phillips, 2009). Regarding 
their war borders and the effect that 
episode generated on the local po-
pulation, Beltrame said that “in some 
Rio’s favelas, urban warfare is develo-
ped for territorial, economic, and so-
cial control” (IISS, 2015, p.2). Often 
when a band leader dies or is captured 
by the police, rivals try to expand their 
territory and invade the Boca do Fumo 
(sale point) in communities dominated 
by the criminal group. This fierce rival-
ry has led to a deeply rooted animosity 
between drug trafficking organizations 
and the birth of schisms competing 
to maximize the benefits of drug tra-
fficking in 763 Rio’s favelas, home to 
about 1/4 of the Carioca’s population 
(Klaubert & Kruger,2014).
There are four facções criminosas con-
trolling favelas. The oldest of them is Co-
mando Vermelho (CV), which emerged 
in the late ‘70s with the aim of mono-
polizing the Carioca’s drug trafficking. 
Then, in the mid-80’s Terceiro Coman-
do (TC) was born, violently disputing te-
rritories with CV, thus initiating an arms 
race between the two commands for 
possession of more efficient and lethal 
weapons to make them able to ensure 
control of Bocas do Fumo and its expan-
sion into other favelas (Sampaio, 2014). 
In the mid-90’s, a dissidence emerged 
that came into conflict with both cri-
minal gangs: Amigos dos Amigos (ADA) 
and Terceiro Comando Puro (TCP). The 
fierce struggle for territory between 
the various criminal organizations, and 
between them and the police, led to 
unprecedented violence levels that 
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resulted in a dramatic increase in the 
number of fatalities in Marvelous City. 
Indeed, during the 90’s, the homici-
de rate reached a peak of 85/100,000 
people (UCDP, 2016). However, it’s 
clear that confrontation involved three 
other actors: 
First, there are the militias, defined by 
sociologist Ignacio Cano (2012a, p. 15) 
as formed by former or active police 
officers and characterized by the fo-
llowing features of paramilitary groups: 
• Rivaling facções criminosas in the 
territorial domain of communities; 
• Exert coercion among the popu-
lation living in the favelas through 
violence and extortion; 
• Main motivation is financial gain; 
• Legitimated themselves as positi-
ve alternatives to drug trafficking 
through the provision of services 
such as order and sale of gas, priva-
te transport system, and installation 
of underground cable TV or Inter-
net connection;
• Their chain of command acts under 
high officials of State. 
These illegal armed groups are another 
source of criminal violence, which da-
tes back to the ‘90s. At that time, the 
militiamen expelled drug traffickers in 
some communities, selling protection 
to residents and merchants in Rio’s fa-
velas located mostly in the west of the 
city. Members of the police apparatus 
were always present in these groups, 
but from the 90’s on they stopped me-
diating between political interests and 
the favelas people, controlling them as 
politically legitimated. Under this lo-
gic, International Amnesty has raised 
awareness on the risk of the Carioca’s 
authorities participating, either by 
complicity or omission, in the establis-
hment of a non-government in areas 
controlled by these groups noting that 
“so far, the government of Rio de Ja-
neiro has been far from fulfilling its 
responsibility to combat these vigilante 
groups, and this has reinforced their 
sense of legitimacy” (Nuñez, 2010).
Militias wield significantly extensive 
clandestine support of authorities sin-
ce their operations are based mainly 
on political favors, maintaining direct 
links with representatives of the legis-
lative and judiciary powers. Even they 
use their policies to influence state 
elections connections, coercing favelas 
residents to vote for certain candidates 
proposed by the militias. So those ille-
gal security forces whose power of ex-
tortion and land area increased rapidly 
ended up having an increasing influen-
ce on the local government act. In that 
vein, a report prepared by the Institu-
te of Social and Political Studies notes 
that between 2005 and 2010 militias 
tripled the areas under their control in 
Rio de Janeiro. Moreover, according to 
data provided by the Research Center 
on Violence, in 2013 the militias do-
minated 41.5% of Rio’s favelas, while 
drug trafficking controlled only 56% of 
them (Efe, 2013). 
Accordingly, it is possible to observe 
that in the case of militias, there would 
be a transversality between powers, a 
synergy between formal and informal 
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institutions, becoming difficult to be 
distinguished, for example between 
the police and the militia. This is be-
cause the police is perceived as a lesser 
evil militia compared to facções crimi-
nosas and this allow them to continue 
operating given that many of its mem-
bers were former colleagues. Similarly, 
militias avoid clashes with the security 
forces, unlike drug organizations, ge-
nerating mutual acceptance and con-
tributing to strengthen the impression 
that militia controlled favelas are safer 
than those dominated by drug traffic-
kers. However, although the militias 
prevent drug traffickers to install in 
area under their domain, there are si-
tuations in which, for a long and esta-
blished practice of patronage, some of 
them, in case they don’t get the expec-
ted revenues, sell control of its territory 
to facções criminosas and they end up 
serving as protectors of criminal orga-
nizations (Koonings & Koenders,2012).
On the other hand, government and 
the police, although sometimes consid-
ered actors, are two forces that exert 
different types of control within favelas. 
During the 80’s and 90’s, as economic 
power of facções criminosas grew into 
communities, networks between AN-
SA’s and state authorities were created 
as well as with the police; even some 
politicians funneled resources from 
favelas to end up at the hands of drug 
traffickers in exchange for votes. Links 
that remain in force, although less visi-
ble, until today. In that sense, Desmond 
Arias argues that “the persistence of 
high levels of violence [in favelas] is not 
the result of the inability of institutions, 
but rather of criminal networks involv-
ing community leaders, politicians, and 
the police” (Arias, 2006, p.293). 
Proof of this is that facções criminosas 
and militias charged at municipal and 
state candidates between US$35,000 
and US$45,000 for campaigning on 
their territory, and up to US$132,000 
to ensure the support of community 
leaders in elections. Criminal groups 
also create blacklists of applicants and 
conducted informal surveys, charging 
applicants according to the size of the 
electorate. And while in the past crimi-
nal organizations of political campaigns 
were profitable, according to O Globo, 
the standards set by these organizations 
are now more stringent, and the pheno-
menon has spread to areas that in the 
past weren’t affected (Gurney,2014). 
Michael Misse suggests that dynamics 
as described previously obey to politi-
cal goods “produced in an asymmetric 
exchange, often compulsive, beyond 
the interest that both parties have to 
do so. Its price depends simultaneously 
on a political calculation and on a 
correlation of forces to acquire eco-
nomic characteristics” (2015, pp. 79-
80). Likewise, they can be produced 
by the privatization of state powers by 
a public official as is the case of co-
rruption, or simply the possession of 
information, strength, power, or an-
ything enough to force somebody into 
exchange in a relationship of violence, 
such as extortion.
Finally, the police also plays a role as 
a gravitating coercive apparatus that 
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is physically present in communi-
ties and which attempts to meet the 
government’s agenda. Historically, the 
security forces acted independently of 
the government in favelas, establishing 
connections with criminal groups to ob-
tain individual benefits, that iss, there 
was no effort to combat facções crimi-
nosas as long as they paid off. Indeed, 
it’s estimated that up to 50% of the 
profits of drug trafficking organizations 
were to police officers (Glenny, 2012). 
Thus, practices such as arrego (weekly 
payment from local traffickers to co-
rrupt police to do not hinder the deve-
lopment of their activities) became the 
rule, while the attacks, shootings, and 
extrajudicial executions the exception.
Even the police didn’t usually enter 
favelas, but merely patrolled their pe-
rimeter, leaving the population under 
the rule of ANSA’s. This model of po-
licing, which is basically a strategy of 
containment, reinforced the isolation 
of communities in relation to asfalto. 
Consequently, corruption practiced by 
police officers who were involved in fa-
velas through the relationship of extor-
tion and protection of drug trafficking, 
contributed to the inhabitants of these 
communities to have a negative per-
ception regarding the police presence. 
UPPs... Challenging the 
conventional response
Historically, the strategy adopted by 
Rio‘s government in favelas could be 
described as War on crime consisting 
on launching sporadic offensives mo-
tivated by complaints from neighbors 
or ongoing investigations, emphasizing 
the element of surprise (Cano, 2016; 
Stewart, 2012). In other words, the 
previous strategy was the military op-
eration, but weapons and drugs seizes 
were soon replaced and the operation 
had side effects: police deaths, bandits 
and neighbors victims of this confron-
tation. That, in the end, only increased 
violence: “gangs began recruiting more 
and more children soldiers, who initial-
ly only warned criminals when police 
approached; and soon they had guns 
and community residents saw certain 
romanticism in them, as protectors, but 
they were cruel” (Turati, 2012). Besides 
being extremely ineffective, this strategy 
stigmatized and victimized the people 
of the communities, the vast majority of 
which didn’t belong to organized crime 
groups, but they lived under the con-
stant oppression. Consequently, favelas 
became not only the reason for the war, 
but also the scene of conflict. 
In 2000, already subjected to reverse 
the counterproductive outcomes ge-
nerated by this erroneous approach, 
a new policy option emerged that was 
the direct antecedent of the current 
anti-crime strategy: Police Grouping in 
Special Areas (Grupamento of Policia-
mento em Areas Especiais, GPAE) crea-
ted under the mandate of Governor 
Anthony Garotinho (1999-2002). As 
the name itself suggests, it was a poli-
ce strategy for special areas, territories 
that were, at first, conquered by tra-
ffickers and then controlled by Special 
Forces physically located in the area. 
Unlike the approach described above, 
Esteban Arratia Sandoval
241REVISTA - Bogotá (Colombia) Vol. 12 N.° 2 - Julio-diciembre
GPAE was carried out following these 
guidelines: intolerance to the presen-
ce of firearms circulating within com-
munities; intolerance to the presence 
of youth in criminal activities of any 
nature; and intolerance to the presen-
ce of the police, military, or civilians 
in random acts of violence, abuse of 
power, or criminal practices (World 
Bank, 2012). These pillars, retaken la-
ter by the current approach, represent 
one of the major doctrinal adjustments 
applied in the Carioca police action.
Although the program began to 
function successfully, drug trafficking 
was strong enough to continue ope-
rating, preventing violence in a terri-
tory tacitly controlled by the police. 
Unfortunately, this innovative project 
failed because it was carried out as an 
initiative by a minority segment of the 
Military Police of Rio Janeiro without 
political and institutional support, 
which resulted in a degradation pro-
cess (Mendonça & Moulin, 2013). The 
lack of uniformity in the coordination 
between civil and military police, and 
between the state government and 
the municipality thwarted the efforts 
to strengthen this initiative in public 
security. Additionally, “its abrupt end 
due to political charges, after the Ca-
rioca press denounced the governor 
was tacitly accepting the continuation 
of illicit economies, though without 
violence and without effective control 
of territory” (Misse, 2015, pp.83-84). 
Discredited without greater political 
support, GPAE continue to exist as a 
kind of mini-battalions local, but gra-
dually lost the ability, promised at its 
inception, to control a spatial area. 
Even he not even got to have a tenth 
of the territorial jurisdiction of their 
successors: Pacifying Police Units (Uni-
dades de Polícia Pacificadora, UPPs)
The origins of pacification policy back 
when Rio de Janeiro was selected to 
host 2014 FIFA World Cup in October 
2007, and as host of 2016 Olympics 
Games in October 2009. In this con-
text, the decision to bring peace to the 
favelas desire coincided with the city 
administrators to enforce the promises 
made to Féderation Internationale de 
Football Association and International 
Olympic Committee in generating bet-
ter security for all people of the city, state 
and country. Both sporting mega-events 
placed the Marvelous City on map of 
globalized and competitive cities. From 
this perspective, celebration is an im-
portant showcase to support the Rio‘s 
competitiveness, showing their material 
and symbolic in order to attract foreign 
investment flows resources.
In addition to these events, two structu-
ral and cumulative factors contributed 
to promote the favelas pacification’s. 
On the one hand, political-party har-
mony existing between state and 
federal government allowed open 
a window of opportunity for Eduar-
do Paes (2009-15) and Sérgio Cabral 
(2007-14), Carioca’s mayor and gover-
nor respectively, unify criteria regar-
ding public security and create the UPP 
program. On the other hand, political 
climate of the time is: Eduardo Paes 
and Sergio Cabral they belonged to the 
Brazilian Democratic Movement Party 
242 REVISTA DE RELACIONES INTERNACIONALES, ESTRATEGIA Y SEGURIDAD
BEYOND PACIFICATION. COMPETITION STATE-MAKING IN RIO’S FAVELAS
(PMDB), and former presidents, Lula 
Da Silva (2003-10) and Dilma Rous-
seff (2011-16), were members of the 
Workers Party, the closest allies of the 
PMDB (Ashcroft, 2014). This political 
alignment was very important to coor-
dinate financial, logistical and human 
resources that would require the new 
strategy against organized crime.
Thus, after trial and error, the 
Carioca’s authorities applied the les-
sons learned and chose to turn in a 
public security policy within the fa-
velas launching a new program: Pa-
cifying Police Units. However, one 
wonders, how do UPPs differ from 
other responses made earlier? 
With the arrival in 2007 of former 
governor Sérgio Cabral and Security 
Secretary Jose Mariano Beltrame (first 
police career in the post), the new ad-
ministration dismissed the idea that 
violence in the favelas was due to a 
problem of drug trafficking, criminal 
gangs, and availability of assault wea-
pons, and chose to understand it as a 
matter of territorial control. If violence 
stemmed power that allowed criminal 
gangs control over communities, the 
solution was to recover those spaces 
and restore them to state authority. 
The UPP slogan ‘veio para ficar’ (came 
to stay) resembles notions of a ‘break 
with history’ in Rio’s response to ur-
ban informality and violence (Werling, 
2014). Therefore, the area is configu-
red as a strategic pillar for a pacifica-
tion policy, allowing the playback of 
sovereignty in terms of security and 
service provision.
From this perspective, what differen-
tiates the new approach to War on 
crime is not the mere presence of the 
State in favelas but a change of prio-
rities, an example of what Benjamin 
Lessing (2010) defined as operational 
decriminalization: reorientation of re-
pressive drug policy by operational 
agents of the state forces, from the 
eradication of this illicit economy de-
veloped within communities towards 
minimizing violence, insecurity, and 
other negative externalities associated 
with drug trafficking. This shift in prio-
rities was explained by the State Se-
cretary of Public Security José Mariano 
Beltrame during an interview with The 
Guardian as follows: “We can’t guaran-
tee that we will put an end to drug tra-
fficking, nor do we claim it [because] 
we would have a failed project. What 
we want is to break the paradigm of 
territory controlled by traffickers with 
war’s weapons” (Phillips, 2010). 
In strategic terms, the operational de-
criminalization gives the State a wide 
margin of maneuver to influence the 
behavior of drug traffickers: “Today is 
clear that anyone who intends to use 
drugs, the chemical dependent, will 
get drugs”, said Beltrame. “But the 
guy who might be there selling them 
doesn’t have that power, that influen-
ce” (Lisaardy, 2011a). Politically spea-
king, the strategy of pacification is an 
alternative route found for untying 
traffic and violence associated with it 
without having to face the dilemmas 
implicit in the option to legalize or 
openly negotiate with criminals. The 
State and specifically its security for-
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ces simply defined clear and rational 
manner priorities and acted consis-
tently with them. Consequently, UPPs 
represents a pragmatic choice to the 
failed War on crime, that from a con-
ceptual point of view, can be equated 
with harm reduction: it isn’t intended 
to eliminate the alleged root cause of 
the ills, crime or drugs, but to mitigate 
their adverse effects, such as violence 
and criminal control over communities 
(Turati, 2012).
Under this logic, operational decrimi-
nalization is most clearly perceived in 
the virtual absence of clashes during 
occupations as they happened befo-
re the UPPs. After the occupation and 
installation of the UPPs, clashes and 
deadly incidents are no longer the rule 
and became exceptional situations. 
For example, according to Beltrame, 
regarding the invasion of Rocinha, the 
Amigos dos Amigos stronghold: “The 
result was fantastic. In less than two 
hours, Rocinha was fully occupied 
without a single shot, and the inhabi-
tants moved around the community in 
tranquility” (Koonings, 2014, p.140). 
That statement sends the following 
message: pacification is a success be-
cause occupations are well planned 
and organized; with a minimum of 
violence, are warmly welcomed by 
neighbors who positively perceive the 
State as returning to the favelas. 
Another aspect that distinguishes the 
new approach is the adoption of the 
principles of community policing in 
order to maintain and integrate agents 
in favelas, representing an ambitious 
effort to change the history of police 
abuse in Rio. As the official website of 
the project states: 
Pacifying Police Units is a new mo-
del of public security and police 
that promotes rapprochement bet-
ween population and the police, to-
gether with strengthening of social 
policy in the communities. When 
recovering the zones occupied for 
decades by drug traffickers and re-
cently by militias, territories led by 
the UPPs are peace communities 
(UPP, 2016).
In other words, it replaces War on cri-
me logics with a new approach based 
on the permanent police presence and 
an interactive community. And while 
UPPs exist within traditional police ro-
les, this project grants great importan-
ce to the reconstruction of community 
relations. All officers perform commu-
nity service as part of their routine, 
mainly teaching youth from music to 
karate and computer sciences; it tries 
to transform the troubled relationship 
between police and the community 
(Morse, 2011). 
In this direction, it’s necessary to point 
out that one key of the pacification poli-
cy lies in the recruitment and training of 
agents that make up the UPPs. Former 
Commander of the UPPs José Carvalho 
summarizes: “We needed fresh minds, 
not a Rambo. The old generation of po-
lice was used to kicking doors and ope-
ning fire on the street” (Isacson, 2011). 
In an effort to get rid of this institutional 
culture, only recently graduated from 
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the police academy were selected to 
participate as members. Once accep-
ted into the program, recruits undergo 
three weeks of training that includes 
human rights, sociology, and meetings 
with UPPs commanders to exchange 
experiences, aiming to provide general 
guidance on the status of the specific 
favela in which each officer will ope-
rate. After this brief period of prepara-
tion, UPPs officers are deployed. Thus, 
the emphasis is placed on community 
policing rather than on the repressive 
activity focused on combat. Indeed, 
UPPs agents are much less visibly ar-
med; they don’t carry heavy weapons 
like those used by Special Police Ope-
rations Battalion (known as BOPE).
From that perspective, Joaquin Villalo-
bos explain:
To win the support of citizens, it is 
essential the good behavior of [the 
security forces]. All errors, abuse 
of power, and corruption become 
operational difficulties, loss of infor-
mation, and risks for themselves [the 
police]. Increasing the hostility of ci-
tizens, who in most cases can have 
forced relationships with offenders, 
is a serious error (Villalobos, 2015). 
Therefore, the behavior is not only an 
ethical or human rights issue; it is an 
important component of operational 
efficiency. A better conduct of the for-
ce corresponds more possibly with the 
building up of intelligence networks, 
greater intelligence, and more effi-
ciency (Escoto, 2016). Ultimately, the 
strategy aims to build peace in favelas 
meaning political capital on their favor, 
whose sustainability is highly depen-
dent on their ability, by the state, to 
continue earning the minds and hearts 
of the population. 
From an organizational angle, it is wor-
th to note that Sérgio Cabral launched 
the first decree on this new project, 
Decree 41.650 o Bola da PM n°012, in 
January 2009. This document provides 
in its section 3 that each operation de-
pends on the UPPs and the doctrinally 
Pacification Police Coordination (CPP), 
whose commander reports directly to 
the general commander of the Military 
Police of Rio de Janeiro, and shall esta-
blish the necessary links with the State 
Committee appointed by the governor. 
In other words, the UPPs are operati-
vely disconnected from the rest of the 
territorial structure of the Military Poli-
ce of Rio de Janeiro. Subsequently, Ca-
bral unveiled Decree 42.787 in January 
2011, nearly two years after the pre-
vious document. This decree establis-
hes operational definition, objectives, 
criteria, and implementation of the pa-
cification process (Monroy, 2014). 
Regarding the first aspect, the decree 
defines the Pacifying Police Units as a 
small police force that works exclusi-
vely on a community located in an ur-
ban area delimited by law. Each has its 
own office and can have one or more 
bases. It also has a commander, body of 
officers, sergeants, and soldiers, as well 
as its own equipment, such as cars and 
motorcycles. The UPP program works 
on the principle of policing and has a 
strategy based on partnership between 
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the population and public security ins-
titutions. UPPs act based on respect for 
the culture and characteristics of each 
community, promoting dialogue and 
encouraging the emergence of com-
munity leaders. The program includes 
agreements and partnerships between 
UPPs, government departments, the 
private and the third sector.
About the second point, it states that 
UPPs were designed with the following 
objectives:
• Recover state control over commu-
nities under the influence of facções 
criminosas. 
• Maintaining peace and security in 
favelas to ensure socio-economic 
development of their inhabitants. 
• Breaking War on crime logics in Rio 
de Janeiro (Ashcroft, 2014).
Similarly, the decree ratifies the profi-
le of the target areas where the UPPs 
are installed as follows: “Poor com-
munities with low institutional fra-
mework, high degree of informality, 
and ostensible and opportunistic ins-
tallation of armed criminal groups that 
undermine the rule of law” (Monroy, 
2014, p. 119). To better understand 
the selection criteria by the UPPs, oc-
cupied favelas must use city bounda-
ries created by Institute de Segurança 
Publica (Public Security Institute, ISP). 
Hence, Rio’s state is divided into four 
sections, each designated as Regiõ 
Integrada de Segurança Pública (In-
tegrated Public Security Region, RISP) 
(table 2).
It can be seen in Figure 1 that, sin-
ce its launch in Santa Marta favela 
in December 2008, the pacification 
policy has notoriously favored RISP 
1. Between 2008 and 2010, 11 UPPs 
were installed in RISP 1. From 2010 
to 2012, 15 more were established 
in the first quadrant, and between 
2012 and 2014 12 additional UPPs 
were located in the same section. 
In the same period, RISP 2 accu-
mulated only 3 UPPs, two of which 
(Cidade de Deus and Batam) were 
executed shortly after Santa Marta. 
Then, the third unit of UPP in RISP 
2 was implemented in Vila Kennedy 
during May 2014, more than three 
years later. The last UPP was at RISP 
Table 2. RISP’s Location
RISP Location
RISP 1
Rio´s touristic South Zone as well as Downtown and North Zone. The famous Copacabana, 
Crist Redeemer, Sugar Loaf, as well as both airports of the city are located in this area.
RISP 2
This area encompasses the rest of Rio´s municipality, with upper class (Barra) as well as lower 
class (Bangú, Campo Grande) neighborhoods. 
RISP 3 To the north of Rio lie several municipalities of lower income commuters.
RISP 4
This area includes Rio´s neighbour cities of Niterói, São Gonçalo, and several other 
municipalities further away from the city.
Source: Elaborated by author from Klaubert & Kruger, 2014.
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Table 3. UPPs installed, 2008-14
Favela Implemention Date RISP
Santa Marta 12/19/2008 1
Cidade de Deus 02/16/2009 2
Batam 02/18/2009 2
Chapéu Mangueira e Babilônia 06/10/2009 1
Pavão-Pavãozinho e Cantagalo 12/23/2009 1
Ladeira dos Tabajaras e Cabritos 01/14/2010 1
Morro da Providência, Pedra Lisa e Moreira Pinto 04/26/2010 1
Morro do Borel, Casa Branca, Chácara do Céu, Indiana, Morro do 
Cruz, Catrambi
06/07/2010 1
Formiga 07/01/2010 1
Morro do Andaraí, Nova Divinéia, João Paulo II, Juscelino Kubitschek, 
Jamelão, Morro Santo Agostinho e Arrelia
07/28/2010 1
Salgueiro 09/17/2010 1
Turano 10/30/2010 1
Macacos 11/30/2010 1
Quieto, São João e Matriz 01/31/2011 1
Fallet, Fogueteiro, Coroa 02/25(2011 1
Prazeres, Escondidinho 02/25/2011 1
Morro São Carlos, Mineira, Zinco e Querosone 05/17/2011 1
3, only one in this sector. Finally, it’s 
worth mentioning that RISP 4 hasn’t 
received any UPP. Consequently, of 
the 38 UPPs installed to date only 4 
were implanted outside RISP 1 (see 
Table 3).
Figure 1. Number of UPPS installed per RISP, 2008-14
Source: Elaborated by author from Klaubert & Kruger, 2014
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Favela Implemention Date RISP
Mangueira 11/03/2011 1
Vidigal e Chácara do Céu 01/18/2012 1
Fazendinha 04/18/2012 1
Nova Brasilia 04/18/2012 1
Morro do Adeus/Morro da Baiana 05/11/2012 1
Alemão 05/30/2012 1
Chatuba 06/27/2012 1
Fé/Sereno 06/27/2012 1
Vila Cruzeiro 09/05/2012 1
Vila Proletária da Penha 09/05/2012 1
Rocinha 09/20/2012 1
Manguinhos 01/18/2013 1
Jacarezinho 01/18/2013 1
Barreira/Tuiti 05/22/2013 1
Caju 05/22/2013 1
Arará/Mandela 05/22/2013 1
Cerro-corá 07/25/2013 1
Lins 01/16/.2014 1
Camarista Meier 01/16/2014 1
Mangueirinha 24/02/2014 3
Vila Kenedy 05/23/2014 2
Source: Elaborated by author from UPP Official Website, 2016.
However, it’s natural to wonder why 
most UPPs focus on RISP 1. As indi-
cated, RISP 1 mainly encompasses the 
Southern area of  Rio de Janeiro, which 
includes most of the tourist attractions 
as Maracana Stadium, Crist Redeemer 
and famous beaches as Copacabana 
and Ipanema (see Figure 1). In that 
sense, Ignacio Cano (2012b) argues 
that the vast majority of the UPPs are 
located in the Southern zone since, 
although the region is inhabited by 7% 
of the population, it accounts for 50% 
of formal employment and generates 
33% of the Carioca’s Gross Domes-
tic Product. Addressing RISP 1, UPPs 
ignore the state’s most violent areas. 
Some experts recognize this bias in se-
lection criteria stating that UPPs imple-
mentation doesn’t cover the areas of 
greatest lethality, as Baixada Fluminen-
se or the West, controlled by militias. 
However, most favelas located in RISP 
1 are controlled by facções criminosas 
who want to be closer to its main cus-
tomers: foreign tourists. 
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Figure 2. Map of Rio de Janeiro
Source: International Amnesty, 2016.
Finally, legal framework provides a holistic view of the pacification process in the 
following steps (see Figure 3):
Figure 3. Stages of pacification process
Source: Elaborated by author from Cabral 2011, Muggah, 2013 and Werling, 2014.
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Tactics. This phase is to regain territo-
rial control over the areas submitted by 
criminal groups. To achieve it, the Sta-
te reports that public and early BOPE 
invade a given favela to expel the nar-
cos. BOPE entry represents the re-con-
quest of territory that has been under 
the enemy’s power. Significantly, the 
occupation is previously announced 
in order to avoid confrontation and 
bands voluntarily leave the area or su-
rrender their weapons (Muggah & Sou-
za, 2014; Nicoll, 2015). Even Carioca 
government itself refers to this strategy 
as Announced War, recognizing the 
development of an armed conflict in 
those territories, as well as an attempt 
to approach them more cautiously. 
Stabilization. In the second step of the 
BOPE invasion, the territory is stabili-
zed, neutralizing the last resistance 
cells of criminal gangs and they remain 
in the favela as long as necessary, crea-
ting the conditions necessary to install 
the contingent of the UPPs. Howe-
ver, this phase isn’t well defined, and 
there’s no prescriptive description of 
what should be or include. This spa-
ce, open to interpretation, has allowed 
military intervention with National Se-
curity Force troops, particularly in the 
most populous and conflicting fave-
las: Complexo do Alemao (composed 
by 15 communities totaling 400,000 
inhabitants) or Complexo do Maré 
(composed by16 communities where 
130,000 Cariocas live).
Implantation. The decree states that the 
third step is when the UPPs moves per-
manently to the assigned community 
in order to pave the way for the arrival 
of public and private services, seeking 
the possibility that the community is 
reintegrated into the city, even though 
the program doesn’t intend to im-
plement these services itself. In other 
words, it is designed to set the stage for 
a subsequent phase called “shock of 
order”, in which business and proper-
ty relationships are formalized (Fisher, 
2014). However, actual implementa-
tion is left in the air, without providing 
details on how the UPPs must enter or 
start their activities in the community. 
Typically, this implementation inclu-
des the construction and occupation 
of UPPs bases in strategic locations of 
occupied communities. The presence 
of the headquarters is crucial for the 
success of the strategy as without an 
established base in the favela, UPPs are 
delegitimizing themselves as competi-
tive state construction. Even, the UPPs 
are usually installed in public buildings 
that were abandoned or used by other 
government agencies. There are cases, 
however, as in Batam where the head-
quarters that houses the UPPs worked 
as a hideout for Comando Vermelho 
(Estévez, 2013).
Evaluation and monitoring. The final 
phase of the process sets out to track 
course changes, aiming to continuously 
improve the program. Although this 
step may be more influential to the 
success and development of interven-
tions, the decree doesn’t establish a 
mechanism of control over the paci-
fication process; and it doesn’t deter-
mine formal appropriate indicators for 
monitoring and evaluation for effective
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management (Rodrigues, 2014). With-
out doubt, this ruling has damaged the 
generation of a comprehensive view 
of the process, not only by local com-
manders, but also by the policymakers. 
Consequently, with the lack of an eva-
luation system, the project can’t adapt 
to the demands, thus generating a 
long-term change.
From what was discussed above, we 
can infer that the pacification process 
provides a solution to the crossroads 
of thinking the state from the strong-
weak dichotomy, as a differential pre-
sence and situational playback devices 
are revealed, in many cases illegal and 
informal. Through these devices, the 
state strategically focus on some of its 
facets: repressive-militarist or provider-
institutionalism (Monroy, 2014). 
Under this logic, it should be noted 
that the pacification process has tac-
tical fundamentals underlying Coun-
terinsurgency (COIN), an aspect that 
is clearly evident in how it faces the 
challenge represented by facções cri-
minosas while ANSAs (Karim, 2014; 
Hoelscher & Norheim-Martinsen, 
2014). The philosophy behind the 
pacification was articulated in docu-
ments from the US Consulate in Rio, 
which, exposed by WikiLeaks, showed 
that UPP “shares some characteristics 
with US counter-insurgency doctrine 
and strategy in Afghanistan or Iraq” 
(Arsenault, 2012). Indeed, UPP is 
very counterinsurgency-like approach 
without it being called a COIN, but its 
logic and basic scheme are there: per-
manent presence of State, including 
its law enforcement as well as linking 
the people to State via provision of 
public goods, services and legal eco-
nomy –the essence of what popula-
tion centric COIN is about (Bertetto, 
2012; Felbab-Brown, 2013). 
Since it’s known, COIN implies adopt-
ing multiple measures, whether mili-
tary, economic, political, and social, 
to delimit and turn the insurgency in-
effective (Garcia, 2010, p. 112). Due 
to the fact that the gravity center of 
the gangs in favelas, as well as in the 
case of insurgencies, is the local pop-
ulation, it makes them vulnerable to 
the application of counter-insurgen-
cy methodologies. Traditional COIN 
principles have been critical in the 
strategy of Rio‘s Government, dem-
onstrating that its value and efficiency 
is preserved, even when used against 
criminal groups. 
Additionally, similarity of this strategy 
with the clear, hold, build approach as 
described in the now famous Counte-
rinsurgency Field Manual 3-24, is ob-
vious (Daniel, 2015, p. 100). Indeed, 
Michael Burgoyne (2012) assessed 
how effective are Counterinsurgency 
Field Manual 3-24 principles in their 
efforts against facções criminosas. 
The research results indicate that 10 
out of 12 guidelines contained in this 
document proved to be useful in Rio, 
but need some doctrinal adjustments 
based on the identification of the gra-
vity center of these criminal groups 
(see Table 4).
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Therefore, the main difference be-
tween the traditional COIN strategy 
and the pacification process lies in 
their starting and final conditions. 
Thus, the causes of criminal violence 
in Rio are socio-economic and cul-
tural, more than political-ideological 
as for insurrection. And, instead of 
having as goal to strengthen the gov-
ernment‘s legitimacy, as in a tradi-
tional COIN, the expected result of 
the pacification process is to inte-
grate the communities to the asfalto, 
favoring the welfare and progress of 
local population.
Between 2008 and 2014, 38 UPPs 
have been installed in Rio, benefiting 
1,500,000 people in 264 communi-
ties, which amounts to a land area of 
9,446,047 square meters (see Graphic 
2). Judging from the figures, the paci-
fication policy applied in Marvelous 
City seems to have achieved its main 
objective: to regain state control over 
favelas under the influence of facções 
criminosas.
Table 4. Evaluation of the effectiveness of the Counterinsurgency Field Manual 3-24 principles                   
in the pacification policy
Government legitimacy + Rule of law +
Unity of effort + Long-term commitment +
Primacy of political factors / Use of force +
Knowledge the environment + Small units +
Intelligence driven operations + Learning and adaptation +
Isolation from popular support + Support to host nation /
Source: Elaborated by author from Burgoyne, 2012.
Figure 4. Level coverage of the pacification policy, 2008-14
Source: Elaborated by author from ISP, 2015.
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On the other hand, it is necessary to 
highlight that the pacification policy 
first evaluated its success by the be-
havior of crime rates in the interven-
tion communities. This parameter 
used as its main objective, as descri-
bed by official documents, to reduce 
the levels of violence directly associa-
ted with criminal groups operating in 
these areas. As shown in Figure 5, the 
pacification process has had a signi-
ficant impact in reducing homicides. 
Between 2007 and 2014, the murder 
rate fell more than 65% in intervened 
favelas. In fact, the homicide rate in 
areas with UPPs was 7.4 deaths per 
100,000 inhabitants in 2014, repre-
senting a third of the verified rate in 
2008 (21.5), when the first occupation 
took place. 
Figure 5. Intentional homicide rate in UPPs zones, 2007-14
Source: Elaborated by author from ISP, 2015.
Similarly, Figure 6 show that the 
greatest impact was a substantial de-
cline in the rate of police lethality 
and accounted for only 3.7 resistan-
ce deaths (autos do resistência)2 per 
100,000 inhabitants (20 cases) in pa-
cified areas during 2014, equivalent 
to a reduction of 85% compared to 
that recorded in 2008, 25.2 (136 vic-
tims). Based on these improvements, 
it is estimated that about 5,000 ki-
llings have been prevented since the 
introduction of the new anti-crime 
strategy, i.e., the UPPs has sheltered 
60 lives annually per 100,000 inha-
bitants (Efe, 2015). So, those statistics 
show that “UPP are in many ways a 
police pacification program before 
the approach prevailed [between se-
curity forces]: authorization to kill in 
favelas” (Vigna, 2015). 
In the same way, Figure 7 shows that 
between 2007 and 2014 there was a 
sharp increase in the number of cri-
mes reported in the pacified commu-
2 Autos do resistência refers to homicides resulting from police intervention in the exclusion of unlawfulness 
and is invoked on the grounds of self-defense. Meanwhile, the responsible agents often argue that these 
deaths occur as a result of armed clashes. See: HRW, 2016, p. 48.
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Figure 6. Resistance deaths rate in UPPs zones, 2007-14
Source: Elaborated by author from ISP, 2015.
Figure 7. Crime report rate in UPPs zones, 2007-14
Source: Elaborated by author from ISP, 2015.
Table 5. Crime reported before and after UPPs, 2007-13
Crime
Average monthly cases for community
Monthly rate (average) per 100,000
 in each community
Pre UPP Post UPP Pre UPP Post UPP
Disappearances 0.32 0.71 3.60 6.92
Intentional injury 3.34 11.66 41.33 127.36
Domestic violence 2.17 8.47 27.12 84.66
Threats 2.30 7.97 29.45 99.24
Rape 0.14 0.37 1.35 4.84
Robbery 5.87 2.70 61.23 20.58
Pick pocketing 3.48 5.38 46.46 64.99
Drug related crime 1.91 5.83 24.13 63.93
Note: Bold italic numbers indicate increased incidence during period studied.
Source: Muggah & Szabó, 2016.
nities. Table 5 shows a breakdown in 
this behavior in areas with UPPs bet-
ween 2007 and 2013, revealing that 
the three largest increases correspond 
to intentional and unintentional in-
juries (40% of reports), threats (12%) 
and drug trafficking (5% of cases) (ISP, 
2015, p. 5). 
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In relation to the above, a report pre-
pared by the Laboratório de Análise da 
Violência examined to what extent the 
installation of UPPs affects crime rates 
recorded in communities, concluding 
that while the pacification policy seems 
to have succeeded in reducing armed 
violence, its impact on a wider series 
of crime rates becomes more irregular, 
showing an upward trend. However, 
it’s difficult to know why some crimes 
go up while others go down, and there 
are two plausible hypotheses:
a)  Increased reporting of crimes as a 
result of the increased confidence 
by intervened favelas residents 
when going to the authorities or lo-
cal police without fear of reprisal. 
b)  The Pacification process has un-
dermined the authoritarian social 
control and power structures of 
criminal groups, preventing them 
from applying their codes of con-
duct, resulting in a real increase of 
unarmed crimes and those derived 
from domestic conflicts; this means 
that common crime is replacing 
bigger criminal operations (Muggah 
& Szabó, 2016, p. 13).
Similarly, it is worth to mention that after 
their expulsion as a product of the appli-
cation of the pacification policy, facções 
criminosas were forced to move their 
illicit activities towards peripheral area, 
creating the so-called cockroach effect3. 
As expected, the installation of UPPs 
generated a millionaire prejudice to 
criminal gangs who exploit drug traffic-
king. In fact, a report by the Intelligence 
Department in 2009 revealed that only 
in the communities of the South, the 
drug traffickers stopped receiving up to 
R$1.8 million monthly (Efe, 2014). The-
refore, as argue by Vanda Felbab-Brown 
(2011), instead of achieving a spreading 
ink-spot of security (with a zone of  effec-
tive public security steadily expanding), 
operating clearance as tactical interven-
tions in the first phase of pacification 
process can become a game in which 
violent crime and their negative exter-
nalities simply move to other areas with 
weak state presence.
According to Rio’s authorities, with the 
occupation of some of the largest fave-
las, including Complexo do Alemao, in 
2010, Rocinha, in 2012; Lins, in 2013, 
and more recently Maré, in 2014, CV 
and ADA fled to Chapadão and Pedrei-
ra, turning them into their new centers 
of operations. Particularly, Chapadão 
has been christened New Alemão, re-
ferring to the Alemao slum complex, 
marked by an unprecedented vio-
lence, which was occupied in 2012 
(Thompson, 2012; Belton, 2016). The 
CV now maintains a stronghold in Cha-
padão while the ADA has established a 
significant presence in Pedreira. 
3 According to Bruce Bagley, the cockroach effect occurs when criminal organizations, to avoid detection 
by authorities, after the light has been turned on move from one municipality to another, from one city 
to another, from one country to another; or from one region to another in search of a better context to 
establish and carry out their criminal activities. See: Garzón (2013, p. 12).
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UPP Social… Securitization 
of development?
The process of occupation is carried 
on by the entry of UPP Social for the 
purpose of coordinating the provision 
of goods and services in pacified areas 
and integrating it to the asfalto. This 
phase was designed by Rio’s autho-
rities to coordinate social and urban 
development interventions, with the 
explicit aim of ‘multiplying’ the im-
pact of the pacification process. And 
represents an additional effort for pu-
blic security that is only part of the 
equation to reverse the exclusion in 
favelas; it is also necessary to crea-
te necessary conditions for socio-
economic development. It was also 
influenced by similar projects imple-
mented as part of the counter-insur-
gency operations in the Colombian 
cities of Bogotá and Medellin, and 
bears many similarities to the Natio-
nal Solidarity Program in Afghanistan 
(Foley, 2014).
As indicated by Robert Muggah: “So-
mehow the notion of a UPP and UPP 
Social emerged by default rather than 
by design” (Ramsey, 2014); without 
this being a counterpart to the security 
strategy, the UPPs alone will not contri-
bute to the inclusion of communities, 
and despite the previous work of the 
UPPs in the recovery of territory, the 
social component couldn’t exist. The-
refore, UPP Social program aims to 
complete the pacification process, in-
tegrating the areas taken over by UPPs, 
by promoting socio-economic develo-
pment, and allowing residents’ access 
to the same services and opportunities 
as the rest of the city.
It’s pertinent to mention that the UPP 
Social was launched in August 2010 
under the leadership of the munici-
pality of Rio de Janeiro through Insti-
tuto Pereira Passos (IPP) and with the 
help of the United Nations Human 
Settlements Programme (UN-HABI-
TAT), two years after the first occu-
pation. As pacification process, the 
socioeconomic counterpart is deve-
loped in three stages: 
Starting with pre-implantation, this 
phase, a group of local engineers 
goes around for a particular month 
after the recovery of the territory 
in the UPPs communities talking to 
associations, leaders, and residents 
to begin to identify the most urgent 
demands. This step is followed by 
conducting a rapid participatory 
mapping, which provides a socio-
economic evaluation of each favela. 
Based on this initial diagnosis, it holds 
a UPP Social Forum in each of the 
neighborhoods to discuss the main 
demands identified and possible so-
lutions, assisting representatives of 
all relevant municipal departments 
(health, education, housing, etc.), 
local leaders, the commander of the 
local UPP, and the private sector. The 
results of these forums, including 
the list of applications, participants, 
and achieved agreements are made 
available to the municipal and state 
government. Finally, a team of local 
coordinators of the UPP Social (two 
or three, depending on the size of 
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the community) is set permanently in 
the communities, making daily visits 
to mediate between the community, 
government, and other providers of 
basic services.
Between 2010 and 2016, the Rio de 
Janeiro government has invested a 
total of R$2.1 billion in this initiative, 
obtaining remarkable results in the fol-
lowing areas:
Education. 232 Development Areas 
opened, 49 are in areas occupied by 
UPPs. They have generated 9,295 jobs 
in pacified communities since 2010. 
Investment in the quality of education 
has achieved that the Index Develop-
ment of Basic Education in the ter-
ritories with UPP undergone a great 
evolution. According to data from 
2009 and 2013, in the second seg-
ment, growth in this evaluation notes 
reached 24%. 
Health. Coverage of Family Health 
Strategy in the city increased from 
3% in 2010 to 47.9% in 2016 and 
is expected to reach 70% in 2017. 
However, in pacified areas this index 
is now 73%. In 12 of the 38 favelas 
occupied, coverage reached 100% 
(Borel, Chapéu Mangueira/Babilô-
nia, Formiga, Jacarezinho, Macaques, 
Manguinhos, Pavão-Pavãozinho/Can-
tagalo, Providência, Rocinha, Santa 
Marta, São João, Tabajaras/Kids); and 
three already exceed 90% (Caju - 
97%, Mangueira - 95% and São Car-
los - 92%). The goal for the end of 
2016 is that 80% of the territories have 
achieved 90%.
Elimination of geological risk. In 22 
of 38 areas occupied, R$239 million 
were invested in infrastructure. The 
areas that received interventions were 
Andarai, Barreira do Vasco/Tuiuti, Ba-
tan, Borel, Cerro-Corá, Cidade de 
Deus, Chapéu Mangueira/Babilônia, 
Complexo da Penha, Complexo do 
Alemao, Complexo do Lins, Escon-
didinho/Prazeres, Fallet/Fogueteiro/
Coroa, Formiga, Macacos, Mangueira, 
Providência, Rocinha, Salgueiro, São 
Carlos, São João, Turano, and Vidigal/
Chacara do Ceu.
Dwelling place. Since 2009 it has in-
vested R$882 million, covering 53,000 
households, urbanization programs as 
Morar Carioca in 18 pacified zones. 
Only in Manguinhos, were 9,800 
homes were built, and in Complexo 
do Alemao other 15,500.
Public Services. For example, pub-
lic lighting company RioLuz has 
earmarked R$20.5 million for the 
installation or upgrade of 20,965 lu-
minaires. In fact, in zones as Chapéu 
Mangueira/Babilônia they had an in-
crease of 210% in the number of new 
or upgraded points. Additionally, the 
Municipal Urban Cleaning Company 
(Companhia Municipal de Limpeza 
Urbana, COMLURB) invested R$15.27 
million in the installation of 302 con-
tainers and the purchase of 282 vehi-
cles for logistics in garbage collection 
in 20 communities intervened by UPPs 
(Rio+Social,2016).
However, the UPP Social isn’t only a 
matter for public investment, as indi-
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cated by Wikileaks; the US Consulate 
in Rio reported in 2009 that the Gross 
Domestic Product of the city would 
approximately increase to US$21 bil-
lion if the residents of pacified areas 
were incorporated into formal econo-
my (Halais, 2013). Under this logic, it 
has been suggested that the pacifica-
tion process intended to transform the 
inhabitants of favelas into consumers, 
being understood as the key that has 
allowed the expansion of provision of 
services to its residents (water, elec-
tricity, cable TV and Internet) and an 
incipient regularization goal of integra-
tion of these territories into the city.
Similarly, it’s seen an unprecedented 
opportunity for the expansion of pri-
vate initiatives because, although resi-
dents of the communities are poor, 
companies see favelas as places of in-
creasing opportunity. There are several 
advantages in arrival at the pacified ar-
eas, particularly the media exposure of 
their brands, the ability to expand its 
customer base and sales, and the possi-
bility of creating programs of corporate 
social responsibility that can contrib-
ute to community development, while 
strengthening their reputation as posi-
tive agents in the Carioca society.
On the other hand, the promotion of 
socioeconomic development in favelas 
has generated mixed reactions on their 
residents for it does not only mean to 
guarantee that they enjoy their rights, 
but also the need to meet a series of 
rigged obligations to formalization of 
access to public services in pacified 
communities. This situation has sig-
nificantly increased the cost of living 
in favelas once pacified; all residents 
must pay water bills, electricity, cable 
TV and Internet services previously 
available for free or at minimal cost. 
It should be remembered that prior to 
the arrival of UPP Social, public ser-
vices were supplied illegally by facções 
criminosas thus representing a qualita-
tive leap in terms of availability, access, 
and quality. 
Closely related to the above, Jailson da 
Sauza, director of the Observatory of 
Favelas says: “When the UPPs arrived, 
more taxes, tariffs, and prices rose, the 
space has been re-evaluated, there is 
real estate speculation and that makes 
life difficult for people because mar-
kets fall behind the police” (Selvanaya-
gam,2013). Even, a speculative boom 
has been noticed when the news that 
UPPs will be installed in any favela be-
gin to circulate. The housing market 
has been one of the biggest beneficia-
ries of the pacification policy; the price 
per square meter and rental housing 
tend to increase dramatically in inter-
vened neighboring favelas and neigh-
borhoods at a higher rate than the rest 
of the city. For example, prices have 
increased by 50% in the pacified com-
munities only 24 hours after the BOPE 
raid (Lissardy, 2011b). 
A report prepared by Getulio Vargas 
Foundation in 2013 concluded that 
after the arrival of UPPs, rents in pa-
cified favelas grew 6.8% compared to 
the rest of the city (Griffin, 2016). In 
other words: “Rio is going through a 
huge real estate valuation, but in fa-
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velas is higher, giving rise to what we 
have called the UPP effect” (Lissardy, 
2011b). However, it has been sugges-
ted that the recovery of favelas as Roc-
inha where the houses are on average 
smaller and are home to more people 
than other communities, can bring 
negative consequences, such as the 
rampant growth of illegal settlements 
externalities. 
Conclusions
The analysis of Rio’s experience allows 
the deriving of the following lessons for 
the design of public security policies 
and prevention of violence in Latin 
America:
Firstly, the pacification policy shows 
how policymakers recognized that 
social, political, and economic exclu-
sion is an ideal context in which cri-
me and violence are strengthened. 
It’s necessary to adopt comprehensi-
ve approaches to ensure the success 
of any public security strategy. This is 
particularly true in large urban areas 
that have been victim of anarchy, cri-
me, and neglect by the State for deca-
des, as in the case of Rio’s favelas. For 
this reason, policymakers have applied 
Felbab-Brown’s postulates and re-
conceptualized their strategy against 
facções criminosas as Competition in 
State-Making. 
As previously noted, although repres-
sion is a critical component in go-
vernment response, often must be 
complemented by socio-economic 
policies to provide equal opportuni-
ties and meet the basic needs of com-
munities in order to restore the social 
contract between State and favelas re-
sidents, so that the nexus between the 
population and criminal enclaves crea-
ted by ANSAs break. In short, there are 
two key variables in complex scenarios 
such as the ones analyzed in this work: 
State’s effective authority, accompa-
nied by a provision of public goods 
and services reduce the scale and da-
mage capacity of the illicit economy. 
Thus, Carioca’s authorities adopted 
new premises and set realistic goals: 
eradicate drug trafficking isn’t an attai-
nable goal. It is feasible to minimize 
the impacts of illicit drug markets and 
control exercised by facções criminosas 
in communities. By replacing the pre-
tense of stopping traffic to end armed 
criminal gangs control, policymakers 
moved the debate on public security, 
taking it away from the War on crime 
approach and focusing it on the terri-
torialization of illicit economies. It’s 
therefore necessary to assume that re-
ducing crime is only meaningful to the 
extent that it improves public security.
Similarly, it’s necessary to adapt the 
strategy to the nature of problem to be 
solved: policymakers determined that 
the violence was caused by the territo-
rial control exercised by criminal gangs; 
therefore, the pacification policy focu-
sed on the recovery of these territories. 
For example, the use of specific police 
models, such as community policing 
isn’t due to subjective assessments as 
it enables control of territory rescued 
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by improving the relationship between 
the inhabitants of favelas and UPPs. 
In this regard, another difference of pa-
cification policy when compared with 
previous policies should be highlight: 
the realization of the social agenda af-
ter the police-military operations. The 
creation of UPP Social program to be 
conducted after the phase of stabiliza-
tion and recovery of territory is a great 
indicator of that change. Access to so-
cial programs and social inclusion ini-
tiatives that get multiplied in pacified 
communities due to a deconstruction 
of favelas as the site par excellence of 
crime. Therefore, implementing an in-
clusive component after the repressive 
one in the strategy is crucial for suc-
cessful results.
Fourth, the role of municipal autho-
rities is essential. One can say that 
the best results are obtained when 
municipal and state authorities are 
in charge. A skilled and creative local 
management can make the differen-
ce between success and failure of a 
strategy since many of these plans in-
clude social services managed at the 
local level; the leadership of munici-
pal officials is indispensable. In addi-
tion, local authorities are best placed 
to understand the needs of the com-
munity and to establish a dialogue 
with citizens. However, the effect is 
amplified when there’s harmony bet-
ween all levels of government as hap-
pened in Rio with former Mayor Paes 
and former Governor Cabral from the 
central government. 
Finally, a successful implementation 
of comprehensive strategies against 
crime involves acquiring a lasting 
commitment. For a mayor or gover-
nor, talk to reverse the exclusion can 
generate substantial electoral political 
gains. However, its implementation 
is extremely complex and requires 
long-term planning; ability to obtain 
resources, persuade state institutions 
of various levels involved and invol-
ve civil society organizations and the 
private sector, while maintaining its 
support and commitment for a consi-
derable period.
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